Credal networks for military identification problems  by Antonucci, Alessandro et al.
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 666–679Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / i jarCredal networks for military identiﬁcation problemsq
Alessandro Antonucci a, Ralph Brühlmann b, Alberto Piatti a,*, Marco Zaffalon a
a IDSIA, Galleria 2, CH-6928 Manno (Lugano), Switzerland
bArmasuisse (W + T), Feuerwerkerstrasse 39, CH-3600 Thun, Switzerland
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c tArticle history:
Received 14 January 2008
Received in revised form 22 January 2009
Accepted 29 January 2009
Available online 10 February 2009
Keywords:
Credal networks
Information fusion
Sensor management
Tracking systems0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2009 Elsevier Inc
doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2009.01.005
q This research was supported by Armasuisse, and
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +41 586666661; fax
E-mail addresses: alessandro@idsia.ch (A. Anto
idsia.ch (M. Zaffalon).Credal networks are imprecise probabilistic graphical models generalizing Bayesian net-
works to convex sets of probability mass functions. This makes credal networks particu-
larly suited to model expert knowledge under very general conditions, including states
of qualitative and incomplete knowledge. In this paper, we present a credal network for
risk evaluation in case of intrusion of civil aircrafts into a restricted ﬂight area. The different
factors relevant for this evaluation, together with an independence structure over them,
are initially identiﬁed. These factors are observed by sensors, whose reliabilities can be
affected by variable external factors, and even by the behaviour of the intruder. A model
of these observation processes, and the necessary fusion scheme for the information
returned by the sensors measuring the same factor, are both completely embedded into
the structure of the credal network. A pool of experts, facilitated in their task by speciﬁc
techniques to convert qualitative judgements into imprecise probabilistic assessments,
has made possible the quantiﬁcation of the network. We show the capabilities of the pro-
posed model by means of some preliminary tests referred to simulated scenarios. Overall,
we can regard this application as a useful tool to support military experts in their decision,
but also as a quite general imprecise-probability paradigm for information fusion.
 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In the recent times, the establishment of a restricted or prohibited ﬂight area around important potential targets surveyed
by the armed forces has become usual practice, also in neutral states like Switzerland, because of the potential danger of
terror threats coming from the sky. A prohibited ﬂight area is an airspace of deﬁnite dimensions within which the ﬂight
of aircrafts is prohibited. A restricted ﬂight area is an airspace of deﬁnite dimensions within which the ﬂight of aircrafts
is restricted in accordance with certain speciﬁed conditions [17].
Once a restricted ﬂight area is established for the protection of a single strategic object, all the aircrafts ﬂying in this re-
gion without the required permissions are considered intruders. The restricted ﬂight area can be imagined as divided in two
concentric regions: an external area, devoted to the identiﬁcation of the intruder, where the intruder is observed by many
sensors of the civil and military air trafﬁc control and by the interceptors, and an internal area, which is a small region con-
taining the object to protect and the military units, where ﬁre is eventually released if the intruder is presumed to have bad
aims.
Clearly, not all the intruders have the same intentions: there are intruders with bad aims, called renegades, intruders with
provocative aims, erroneous intruders, and even aircrafts that are incurring an emergency situation. Since only renegades. All rights reserved.
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This is the identiﬁcation problem we address in this paper.
The problem is complex for many reasons: (i) the risk evaluation usually relies on qualitative expert judgements; (ii) it
requires the fusion of information coming from different sensors, and this information can be incomplete or partially con-
tradictory; (iii) different sensors can have different levels of reliability, and the reliability of each sensor can be affected by
exogenous factors, as geographical and meteorological conditions, and also by the behaviour of the intruder. A short review
of the problem and some details about these difﬁculties are reported in Section 2.
In this paper, we propose credal networks [7] (Section 3) as a mathematical paradigm for the modeling of military iden-
tiﬁcation problems. Credal networks are imprecise probabilistic graphical models representing expert knowledge by means
of sets of probability mass functions associated to the nodes of a directed acyclic graph. These models are particularly suited
for modeling and doing inference with qualitative, incomplete, and also conﬂicting information. All these features appear
particularly important for the military problem under consideration.
More speciﬁcally, we have developed a credal network that evaluates the level of risk associated to an intrusion. This is
achieved by a number of sequential steps: determination of the factors relevant for the risk evaluation and identiﬁcation of a
dependency structure between them (Section 4.1); quantiﬁcation of this qualitative structure by imprecise probabilistic
assessments (Section 5.1); determination of a qualitative model of the observation process associated to each sensor, to-
gether with the necessary fusion scheme of the information collected by the different sensors (Section 4.2); quantiﬁcation
of this model by probability intervals (Section 5.2). An analysis of the main features of our imprecise-probability approach
to information fusion is indeed reported in Section 6.
The credal network is ﬁnally employed to evaluate the level of risk, which is simply the probability of the risk factor con-
ditional on the information collected by the sensors in the considered scenario. A description of the procedure used to update
the network, together with the results of some simulations, is reported in Section 7.
Summarizing, we can regard this model as a practical tool to support military experts in their decisions for this particular
problem.1 But, at the same time, our credal network can be regarded as a prototypical modeling framework for general iden-
tiﬁcation problems requiring information fusion.
2. Military aspects
This section focuses on the main military aspects of the identiﬁcation problem addressed by this paper. Let us ﬁrst report
the four possible values of the RISK FACTOR2 by which we model the possible intentions of the intruder.
(i) Renegade. The intruder intends to use his aircraft as a weapon to damage the strategic target defended by the
restricted ﬂight area.3
(ii) Agent provocateur. The aim is to provoke or demonstrate. The intruder knows exactly what he is doing and does
not want to die, therefore he is expected to react positively to radio communication at a certain moment.
(iii) Erroneous. The intruder is entering the restricted ﬂight area because of an error in the ﬂight path due to bad prep-
aration of the ﬂight or insufﬁcient training level.
(iv) Damaged. This is an intruder without bad aims that is incurring an emergency situation due to a technical problem.
The pilot does not necessarily knows what he is doing because of a possible situation of panic. A damaged intruder can
react negatively to radio communications, as their instruments could be switched off because of electrical failures. A
proper identiﬁcation of damaged intruders is very important because they can be easily confused with renegades.
In order to decide which one among these four categories reﬂects the real aim of the intruder an appropriate identiﬁca-
tion architecture should be set up. Fig. 1 displays the structure typically employed in Switzerland. When a restricted ﬂight
area is set up for the protection of an important object, the Air Defence Direction Center (ADDC) is in charge of the identi-
ﬁcation of possible intruders. The ADDC collects the information provided by three main sources: (i) the sensors of the civil
Air Trafﬁc Control (ATC), (ii) the sensors of the military ATC, (iii) the interceptors of the Swiss Air Force devoted to Air Police
missions. Once this evidential information has been collected, the ADDC performs the identiﬁcation of the aim of the
intruder.
The civil ATC sensors are based on a collaborative communication between the ATC and the intruder. In fact, the detection
of the intruder by the ATC is possible only if the intruder is equipped and operates with a transponder. Transponders are elec-
tronic devices that, if interrogated by the civil ATC radar, emit a signal enabling a three-dimensional localization. Radars
based on this principle are called Secondary Surveillance Radars (SSRs). Transponders emit also an identiﬁcation code.
We consider the identiﬁcation code Mode 3/A, which, in certain cases, does not allow the exact identiﬁcation of the intruder1 The support we provide is represented by the probabilistic information about the actual level of risk associated to an intrusion. Decisions about possible
interventions can be based on this information, but are still taken by military experts. A model of such decision process, to be embedded into the network
structure, could be explored (e.g., by considering the ideas in [1] and their development in [10]), but is beyond the scope of this paper.
2 The following typographical convention is used: the variables considered in our probabilistic model are written in SMALL CAPITALS and their possible states in
typewriter.
3 There are also some subcategories of terrorists (e.g., poison sprayers), which will be considered only in a future work.
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Fig. 1. The identiﬁcation architecture.
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out that, if the transponder is switched off, the intruder remains invisible to the civil ATC because the SSR is unable to detect it.
Overall, we summarize the information relevant for the identiﬁcation gathered by the civil ATC in terms of two distinct
factors: the TRANSPONDER MODE 3/A, indicating if and possibly what type of identiﬁcation code has been detected by the SSR;
and the ATC REACTION, describing the response of the intruder to the instructions that civil ATCs report to aircrafts ﬂying in the
direction of the restricted area in order to deviate them from their current ﬂight route.
Unlike civil ATC sensors, sensors managed by the military ATC and military Air Police units are based on a non-collabo-
rative observation of the intruder. The main military ATC sensors are radar stations detecting the echoes reﬂected by the
intruder of radio pulses emitted by the radar. These radars provide a continuous three-dimensional localization of the intru-
der. The other military sensors, which are particularly suited for the identiﬁcation of intruders ﬂying at relatively low height,
are the pointing devices of anti-air ﬁring units (two-dimensional and tracking radars, cameras) and the Ground Observer
Corps (GOCs), which are military units equipped with optical instruments to observe the intruder from the ground.
The information gathered by these sensors which is relevant for the identiﬁcation of the intentions of the intruder can be
summarized by the following factors: AIRCRAFT HEIGHT, HEIGHT CHANGES, ABSOLUTE SPEED, FLIGHT PATH, AIRCRAFT TYPE, and also REACTION TO
ADDC, which is the analogous of REACTION TO ATC, but referred to the case of detection by the military ATC.
Finally, regarding the information gathered by the interceptors of the Air Force, which is reported to the ADDC, the pos-
sible identiﬁcation missions of the interceptors are divided into three categories according to the International Civil Aviation
Organization: surveillance, identiﬁcation and intervention. In the ﬁrst type of mission, the interceptor does not establish a vi-
sual contact with the intruder but observes its behaviour using sensors; the interceptor is therefore considered as a sensor
observing the same factors as the other sensors of the civil and military ATC. In the second and in the third type of missions,
the interceptor establishes a visual contact with the intruder with the intention of observing it (identiﬁcation), or giving it
instructions in order to deviate the aircraft from the current ﬂight route, or also to land it (intervention). The reaction of the
intruder to interception is very informative about its intentions. We model this reaction to the latter two types of mission by
the factor REACTION TO INTERCEPTION.
The intruder is assumed to be observed during a sufﬁciently long time window called observation period. All the factors
we have deﬁned in order to describe the behaviour of the intruder during this observation period are discrete variables,
whose (mutually exclusive and exhaustive) possible values are deﬁned with respect to the dynamic component of the iden-
tiﬁcation process, in order to eliminate the dependency of the model on local issues. To explain how these aspects are taken
into account, we detail the deﬁnitions of the factors FLIGHT PATH and HEIGHT CHANGES. The ﬁrst factor describes the route fol-
lowed by the intruder during the observation period from an intentional point of view and not from a physical or geograph-
ical perspective. Accordingly, their possible values are deﬁned as follows:
(i) Suspicious route. The intruder follows a suspicious ﬂight route in the direction of the protected objects.
(ii) Provocative route. The intruder ﬂights in the restricted area without approaching signiﬁcantly the protected
objects in an apparently planned way.
(iii) Positive reaction route. The intruder corrects its ﬂying route according to the instructions of the ATC or of the
interceptors or spontaneously.
(iv) Chaotic route. The intruder follows an apparently chaotic ﬂight path.4 The most informative identiﬁcation code Mode S is not considered here, because it has not yet been implemented extensively in practice.
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route observed on the radar or on other sensors by the ADDC is interpreted from an intentional point. Similarly, the factor
HEIGHT CHANGES describes the behaviour of the intruder with respect to its height, by the following possible values.
(i) Climb. The intruder is climbing, i.e., increasing its height.
(ii) Descent. The intruder is descending. i.e., decreasing its height.
(iii) Stationary. The intruder maintains roughly the same height.
(iv) Unstable. The intruder climbs and descends in an alternate way.
These values reﬂect an observation of the dynamic behaviour of the intruder during the observation period.
Another important issue of our model is the distinction between the number of sensors available in the identiﬁcation
architecture and the evaluation of their efﬁciency, for a characterization of the quality of the observations. Note, for instance,
that the quality of the observation of the FLIGHT PATH provided by a low number of GOCs would be scarce, exactly as the obser-
vation provided by a high number of GOCs, working under bad meteorological conditions.
By this example, we intend to point out that a proper description of the identiﬁcation architecture can be obtained by
distinguishing between the presence and the reliability of each sensor. The presence depends on the speciﬁc identiﬁcation
architecture, on the technical limits of the sensors, and also on the behaviour of the intruder itself, being in particular af-
fected by the AIRCRAFT HEIGHT (e.g., some sensors can observe the intruder only if it is ﬂying at low heights). The reliability
depends on the meteorological and geographical conditions, on speciﬁc technical limits of the sensors (e.g., radars have
low quality in the identiﬁcation of the AIRCRAFT TYPE, independently of its presence) and on the AIRCRAFT HEIGHT. All these aspects
are implicitly considered during the speciﬁcation of the presence and the reliability of the different sensors. This model of the
identiﬁcation architecture is detailed in Section 4 and Section 5.3. Mathematical aspects
In this section, we brieﬂy recall the deﬁnitions of credal set and credal network [7], which are the mathematical objects we
use to model expert knowledge and fuse different kinds of information in a single coherent framework.
3.1. Credal sets
Given a variable X, we denote by XX the possibility space of X, with x a generic element of XX . Denote by PðXÞ a mass
function for X and by PðxÞ the probability of x.
We denote by KðXÞ a closed convex set of probability mass functions over X. KðXÞ is said to be a credal set over X. For any
x 2 XX , the lower probability for x according to the credal set KðXÞ is PðxÞ ¼ minPðXÞ2KðXÞPðxÞ. Similar deﬁnitions can be pro-
vided for upper probabilities, and more generally lower and upper expectations. A set of mass functions, its convex hull, and
its set of vertices (i.e., extreme points) produce the same lower and upper expectations and probabilities. Accordingly, a cre-
dal set can be deﬁned by an explicit enumeration of its vertices.
A set of probability intervals over XX , say IX ¼ fIx : Ix ¼ ½lx;ux;0 6 lx 6 ux 6 1; x 2 XXg induces the speciﬁcation of a credal
set KðXÞ ¼ fPðXÞ : PðxÞ 2 Ix; x 2 XX ;
P
x2XX PðxÞ ¼ 1g. IX is said to avoid sure loss if the corresponding credal set is not empty,
and to be reachable (or coherent) if ux0 þ
P
x2XX ;x–x0 lx 6 1 6 lx0 þ
P
x2XX ;x–x0ux, for all x 2 XX . IX is reachable if and only if the
intervals are tight, i.e., for each lower or upper bound in IX there is a mass function in the credal set at which the bound
is attained [19]. A non-reachable set of probability intervals avoiding sure loss can be always reﬁned in order to become
reachable [5]. The vertices of a credal set deﬁned by a reachable set of probability intervals can be efﬁciently computed using
standard reverse search enumeration techniques [3,5].
Here, we focus on credal sets deﬁned through reachable probability intervals, as they appear as a very natural way to cap-
ture the kind of human expertize we want to reproduce by our model (see Section 5). Nevertheless, apart from the case of
binary variables, it is possible to consider credal sets that cannot be obtained by probability intervals.
Dealing with credal sets instead of single probability mass functions needs also a more general concept of independence.
The most commonly adopted concept is strong independence. Two generic variables X and Y are strongly independent when
every vertex of the underlying credal set KðX;YÞ satisﬁes standard stochastic independence of X and Y. Finally, regarding con-
ditioning with credal sets, we can compute the posterior credal set KðXjY ¼ yÞ as the union, obtained by element-wise appli-
cation of Bayes’ rule, of all the posterior mass functions PðXjY ¼ yÞ (the lower probability of the conditioning event is
assumed positive).55 If only the upper probability is positive, conditioning can be still obtained by regular extension [20, App. J]. The stronger condition assumed here is required
by the inference algorithms we adopt, and it is always satisﬁed in our tests (see Section 7).
670 A. Antonucci et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 666–6793.2. Credal networks
Let X be a vector of variables and assume a one-to-one correspondence between the elements of X and the nodes of a
directed acyclic graph G. Accordingly, in the following we will use node and variable interchangeably. For each Xi 2 X;Pi de-
notes the set of the parents of X, i.e., the variables corresponding to the immediate predecessors of X according to G.
The speciﬁcation of a credal network over X, given the graph G, consists in the assessment of a conditional credal set
KðXijpiÞ for each possible value pi 2 XPi of the parents of Xi, for each variable Xi 2 X.6
The graph G is assumed to code strong independencies among the variables in X by the so-called strongMarkov condition:
every variable is strongly independent of its nondescendant non-parents given its parents. Accordingly, it is therefore pos-
sible to regard a credal network as a speciﬁcation of a credal set KðXÞ over the joint variable X, with KðXÞ the convex hull of
the set of joint mass functions PðXÞ ¼ PðX1; . . . ;XnÞ over the n variables of the net, that factorize according to
Pðx1; . . . ; xnÞ ¼
Qn
i¼1PðxijpiÞ. Here pi is the assignment to the parents of Xi consistent with ðx1; . . . ; xnÞ; and the conditional
mass functions PðXijpiÞ are chosen in all the possible ways from the extreme points of the respective credal sets. KðXÞ is
called the strong extension of the credal network. Observe that the vertices of KðXÞ are joint mass functions PðXÞ. Each of them
can be identiﬁed with a Bayesian network [13], which is a precise probabilistic graphical model. In other words, a credal net-
work is equivalent to a set of Bayesian networks.
3.3. Computing with credal networks
Credal networks can be naturally regarded as expert systems. We query a credal network to gather probabilistic informa-
tion about a variable given evidence about some other variables. This task is called updating and consists in the computation,
with respect to the network strong extension KðXÞ, of PðXqjXE ¼ xEÞ and PðXqjXE ¼ xeÞ, where XE is the vector of variables of
the network in a known state xE (the evidence), and Xq is the node we query. Credal network updating is an NP-hard task
(also for polytrees) [9], for which a number of exact and approximate algorithms have been proposed (e.g., [8] for an
overview).
4. Qualitative assessment of the network
We are now in the condition to describe the credal network developed for our application. According to the discussion in
the previous section, this task ﬁrst requires the qualitative identiﬁcation of the conditional dependencies between the vari-
ables involved in the model, which can be coded by a corresponding directed graph.
As detailed in Section 2, the variables we consider in our approach are: (i) the RISK FACTOR, (ii) the nine variables used to
assess the intention of the intruder, (iii) the variables representing the observations returned by the sensors, and (iv) for each
observation two additional variables representing the level of PRESENCE and RELIABILITY of the relative sensor. In the following,
we refer to the variables in the categories (i) and (ii) as core variables.
4.1. Risk evaluation
Fig. 2 depicts the conditional dependencies between the core variables according to the military and technical consider-
ations of the Expert.7 The speciﬁcation of this part of the network has required a considerable amount of military and technical
expertise that, due to conﬁdentiality reasons, cannot be explained in more detail here.
4.2. Observation and fusion mechanism
In this paper, we follow the general deﬁnition of latent and manifest variables given by [18]: a latent variable is a variable
whose realizations are unobservable (hidden), while a manifest variable is a variable whose realizations can be directly ob-
served. According to [4], there may be different interpretations of latent variables. In our model, we consider a latent variable
as an unobservable variable that exists independent of the observation. The core variables in Fig. 2 are regarded as latent vari-
ables that, to be determined, usually require the fusion of information coming from different sensors, with different levels of
reliability. The observations of the different sensors are considered manifest variables.8 Nevertheless, in the case of the iden-
tiﬁcation code emitted by the intruder (TRANSPONDER MODE 3/A), the REACTION TO INTERCEPTION observed by the pilot, and the REACTION TO
ATC observed by the controllers through SSR, the observation process is immediate; thus we simply identify the latent with the
corresponding manifest variable. Clearly, if the RISK FACTOR was the only latent variable, the network in Fig. 2 would be the6 This deﬁnition assumes the credal sets in the network to be separately speciﬁed, i.e., selecting a mass function from a credal set does not inﬂuence the
possible choices in others. Other possible speciﬁcations can be considered. We point the reader to [1] for a general uniﬁed graphical language that allows for
these speciﬁcations.
7 In this paper we brieﬂy call Expert a pool of military experts, we have consulted during the development of the model.
8 The manifest variables we consider are therefore referred to the observations of corresponding latent variables. Thus, if X is a latent variable, the possibility
space XO of the corresponding manifest variable O takes values in the set XX augmented by the supplementary possible value missing (we denote this value
by ‘’).
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Fig. 2. The core of the network. Dark gray nodes are observed by single sensors, while light gray nodes are observed by sets of sensors for which an
information fusion scheme (see Section 4.2) is required.
A. Antonucci et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 666–679 671complete network needed to model the risk evaluation. But, because we are dealing with latent variables observed by many
sensors, a model of the observation process and a fusion mechanism have to be added to the current structure.
4.2.1. Observation mechanism
We begin by considering observations by single sensors, and then we explain the fusion scheme for several sensors. Con-
sider the following example: suppose that an intruder is ﬂying at low height and is observed by ground-based observation
units in order to evaluate its FLIGHT PATH. For this evaluation, the intruder should be observed by many units. If our identiﬁ-
cation architecture is characterized by too a low number of observation units, it is probable that the observation would be
incomplete or even absent, although the meteorological and geographical conditions are optimal. In this case, the poor qual-
ity of the observation is due to the scarce presence of the sensor. Suppose now that the architecture is characterized by a very
large number of observation units but the weather is characterized by a complete cloud cover with low clouds, then the qual-
ity of the observation is very poor although the presence of units is optimal. In this case the poor quality of the observation is
due to the scarce reliability of the sensor under this meteorological condition.
This example motivates our choice to deﬁne two different factors in order to model the quality of an observation by a
sensor. Fig. 3 illustrates, in general, how the evidence provided by a sensor about a latent variable is assessed. The manifest
variable depends on the relative latent variable, on the PRESENCE of the sensor (with possible values present, partially
present and absent), and its RELIABILITY (with possible values high, medium and scarce).
According to the military principles outlined in Section 2, the RELIABILITY of a sensor can be affected by the meteorological
and geographical situation and also by the AIRCRAFT HEIGHT, while, regarding the PRESENCE, only the AIRCRAFT HEIGHT and the iden-
tiﬁcation architecture affect the quality of the observations. The inﬂuence of the latent variable AIRCRAFT HEIGHT is related toAIRCRAFT
HEIGHT
EXOGENOUS
FACTORS
SENSOR
PRESENCE
SENSOR
RELIABILITY
MANIFEST
VARIABLE
LATENT
VARIABLE
Fig. 3. Observation by a single sensor. The latent variable is the variable to be observed by the sensor, while themanifest variable is the value returned by the
sensor itself.
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RELIABILITY
SENSOR 1
RELIABILITY
SENSOR 2
RELIABILITY
SENSOR 3
RELIABILITY
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PRESENCE
SENSOR 1
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PRESENCE
SENSOR 4
SENSOR 1
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SENSOR 3
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Fig. 4. The determination of the latent variable type of aircraft by four sensors.
672 A. Antonucci et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 666–679the technical limits of the sensors: there are sensors that are speciﬁc of the low and very low heights, like tracking radars and
cameras; other sensors, like the primary surveillance radars, are always present at high and very high heights, but are not
always present at low and very low heights.
Meteorological and geographical conditions do not affect the PRESENCE of a sensor, but only its RELIABILITY. It is worthy to
point out that these exogenous factors are always observed and we will not display them explicitly as network variables,
being considered by the Expert during his quantiﬁcation of the RELIABILITY.9
4.2.2. Sensors fusion
At this point we can explain how the information collected by the different observations of a single latent variable re-
turned by different sensors can be fused together. Consider, for example, the determination of the latent variable AIRCRAFT
TYPE. This variable can be observed by four types of sensors: TV cameras, IR cameras, ground-based observation units and
air-based interceptors. For each sensor, we model the observation using a structure like the network in Fig. 3: there is a node
representing the PRESENCE of the sensor and a node representing the RELIABILITY, while the variable AIRCRAFT HEIGHT inﬂuences all
these nodes. Accordingly, for each combination of PRESENCE and RELIABILITY, a different model of the relation between the man-
ifest and the latent variable (i.e., a model of the sensor performances) should be speciﬁed.10 Overall, we obtain a structure like
in Fig. 4, which permits the fusion of the evidence about the latent variables coming from the different sensors, taking into ac-
count the reliability of the different observations and without the need of any external speciﬁcation of explicit fusion proce-
dures. This is obtained by simply assuming the conditional independence among the different sensors given the value of the
ideal variable. Section 6 reports a note on the main features of this approach, which has been inspired by similar techniques
adopted for Bayesian networks [11].
4.2.3. Whole network
The procedure considered in the previous paragraph for the node AIRCRAFT TYPE is applied to every latent variable requiring
information fusion from many sensors. This practically means that we add a subnetwork similar to the one reported in Fig. 4
to each light gray node of the network core in Fig. 2. The resulting directed graph, which is still acyclic, is shown in Fig. 5. A
more compact speciﬁcation could be obtained by extending the formalism of object-oriented Bayesian networks [12] to credal
networks. Accordingly, we can regard the boxed subnetworks in Fig. 5, modeling the observations of the ideal factors, as dif-
ferent instances of a given class, for which appropriate speciﬁcations of the attributes (possible values, number of sensors,
etc.) have been provided.
5. Quantitative assessment of the network
As outlined in Section 3, the speciﬁcation of a credal network over the variables associated to the directed acyclic graph in
Fig. 5 requires the speciﬁcation of a conditional credal set for each variable and each possible conﬁguration of its parents.9 As noted in Section 5.2, the Expert is not required to quantify these nodes for each possible conﬁguration of the exogenous factors, but only for the speciﬁc
conditions observed at the moment of the quantiﬁcation. For this reason, these factors are not included among the variables of the model.
10 Here the RELIABILITY is intended as a global descriptor of the sensor performances. The quality of a particular observation can be clearly affected by the value
of the ideal variable, but this is modeled in the relation between the latent and the ideal variable.
Fig. 5. The complete structure of the network. Black nodes denote manifest variables observed by the sensors, latent variables corresponding to the
unobserved ideal factors are gray, while presences, reliabilities, and the risk factor are white. Boxes highlight the different subnetworks modeling the
observation process for the ideal factors.
A. Antonucci et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 666–679 673Speciﬁc procedures for the quantiﬁcation of these credal sets based on Expert’s qualitative judgements have been developed
for the core variables (Section 5.1) and for the nodes modeling the observation process (Section 5.2).
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Because of the scarcity of historical cases, the quantiﬁcation of the conditional credal sets for the core variables in Fig. 2 is
mainly based uponmilitary and technical considerations. The Expert provided a number of qualitative judgements like ‘‘erro-
neous intruders are light aircrafts with good chance” and ‘‘erroneous intruders are business jets with little chance”, later translated
into the following speciﬁcations for the bounds of the probability intervals:Pðlight aircraftjerroneousÞP :65;
Pðbusiness jetjerroneousÞ 6 :20:This kind of elicitation has been obtained following Walley’s guidelines for the translation of natural language judgements
[21, p. 48]. Clearly, there is a degree of arbitrariness in choosing single numbers for the bounds of the probability intervals,
but much less than in similar approaches based on precise probabilities.
In some situations, the Expert was also able to identify logical constraint among the variables. As an example, the fact that
‘‘balloons cannot maintain high levels of height” represents a constraint between the possible values of the variables AIRCRAFT
TYPE and AIRCRAFT HEIGHT, that can be embedded into the structure of the network by means of the following zero probability
assessment:Pðvery highjballoonÞ ¼ 0:
Overall, the conditional credal sets corresponding to elicited probability intervals have been computed according to the
procedure outlined in Section 3.1 and a well-deﬁned credal network over the graphical structure in Fig. 2 has been
concluded.
5.2. Observations, presence and reliability
To complete the quantiﬁcation of the credal network over the whole graphical structure in Fig. 5, we should discuss, for
each sensor, the quantiﬁcation of the variables modeling the observation process.
We begin by explaining how PRESENCE and RELIABILITY are speciﬁed. Consider the network in Fig. 3. The Expert should quan-
tify, for each of the four possible values of AIRCRAFT HEIGHT, two credal sets, one for the PRESENCE and one for the RELIABILITY. For the
ﬁrst, he takes into consideration only the structure of the identiﬁcation architecture; while for the second, also the actual
meteorological and geographical situation should be considered.
In principle, this quantiﬁcation task would require that the Expert answer questions like, ‘‘what is the probability (interval)
that the ground-based observers have scarce (or medium, or high) reliability in observing an aircraft ﬂying at low height, if the
meteorological condition is characterized by dense low clouds and we are in the plateau?”. Clearly, it can be extremely difﬁcult
and time-consuming to answer dozens of questions of this kind in a coherent and realistic way. For this reason, we simply
ask the Expert to provide characteristic levels of PRESENCE and RELIABILITY. That can be obtained by questions like the following,
‘‘what is the reliability level that you expect from ground-based observations of an aircraft ﬂying at low height, if the meteorological
condition is characterized by dense low clouds and we are in the plateau?”. The latter question is much simpler, because one is
required to specify something more qualitative than probabilities. Together with the characteristic levels, the Expert also
indicates whether or not he is uncertain about these values. Finally, for each combination of expected levels and relative
uncertainty, a ﬁxed credal set is deﬁned together with the Expert. That substantially simpliﬁes the quantiﬁcation task, while
maintaining a large ﬂexibility in the speciﬁcation of the model. As an example, assuming that Expert’s expected level of reli-
ability is high with no uncertainty, a degenerate (precise) speciﬁcation is adopted, i.e.,PðReliability ¼ highjAircraft Height ¼ lowÞ ¼ 1;
while, in case of uncertainty about such expected level, an interval [.9,1] is considered instead, and a corresponding non-zero
probability for the medium level of reliability should be assumed. Analogous procedures have been employed for the quan-
tiﬁcation of the PRESENCE.
Regarding the observations, a conditional credal set for each possible value of the corresponding latent variable and each
possible level of RELIABILITY and PRESENCE should be assessed.
Let X be a latent variable denoting an ideal factor and O the manifest variable corresponding to the observation of X as
returned by a given sensor. For each possible joint value of RELIABILITY and PRESENCE, say ðr; pÞ, we should assess lower and upper
bounds for PðO ¼ ojX ¼ x; r; pÞ, for each x 2 XX and o 2 XO ¼ XX [ fg, and then compute the corresponding credal sets.
This quantiﬁcation step can be simpliﬁed by deﬁning a symmetric non-transitive relation of similarity among the ele-
ments of XX . The similarities between the possible values of a latent variable according to a speciﬁc sensor can be naturally
represented by an undirected graph as in the example of Fig. 6. In general, given a latent variable X, we ask the Expert to
determine, for each possible outcome x 2 XX , the outcomes of X that are similar to x and those that are not similar to x.
Having deﬁned, for each latent variable and each corresponding sensor, the similarities between its possible outcomes,
we can then divide the possible observations in four categories: (i) observing the actual value of X; (ii) confounding the real
value of X with a similar one; (iii) confounding the actual value of X with a value that is not similar; (iv) the observation is
missing. The idea is to quantify, instead of a probability interval for PðO ¼ ojX ¼ x; p; rÞ for each x 2 XX and each o 2 XO,
only four probability intervals, corresponding to the four categories of observations described above. As an example,
Fig. 6. An undirected graph depicting similarity relations about the possible values of the variable AIRCRAFT TYPE according to the observation of a TV camera.
Edges connect similar states. The sensor can mix up a light aircraftwith a glider or a jet, but not with a balloon or a helicopter or an airliner.
Table 1
A good quality observation of the AIRCRAFT TYPE based on the graph in Fig. 6. A small probability for missing has been assumed for each value of the ideal
variable. This determines also the probability of observing the actual variable for values that are not similar to any other state. In the other cases, the right
observation has been described by a lower intervals, while the probabilities of confounding the actual value with a similar one are obtained by symmetry and
reachability properties.
Light air Glider Jet Airliner Balloon Helicopter
Light aircraft [.600,.700] [.250,.350] [.125,.175] 0 0 0
Glider [.125,.175] [.600,.700] 0 0 0 0
Jet [.125,.175] 0 [.600,.700] [.250,.350] 0 0
Airliner 0 0 [.125,.175] [.600,.700] 0 0
Balloon 0 0 0 0 [.900,.950] 0
Helicopter 0 0 0 0 0 [.900,.950]
Missing [.050,.100] [.050,.100] [.050,.100] [.050,.100] [.050,.100] [.050,.100]
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TYPE, for a combination ðp; rÞ of the values of PRESENCE and RELIABILITY that models a good (although not perfect) observation
process.
Let us ﬁnally explain how the four probability intervals are quantiﬁed in our network for each combination of RELIABILITY
and PRESENCE and each sensor. The probability interval assigned to the case where the observation is missing depends un-
iquely on the PRESENCE. In particular, the value absent, makes the probability of having a missing observation equal to one
and therefore the probability assigned to all the other cases are equal to zero. It follows that we have only seven combina-
tions of RELIABILITY and PRESENCE to quantify. To this extent, we use constraints based on the concept of interval dominance to
characterize the different combinations.11 In order of accuracy of the observation, the combinations are the following:
(i) High, present. The correct observation dominates (clearly) the similar observations. The probability for non-similar
observations is zero and is therefore dominated by all the other categories.
(ii) High, partially present. The correct observation dominates the similar observations and dominates (clearly) the
non-similar observations. The similar observations dominates the non-similar observations.
(iii) Medium, present. The correct observation dominates the similar observations and dominates the non-similar obser-
vations. The similar observations dominates the non-similar observations.
(iv) Medium, partially present. The correct observation does not dominate the similar observations but dominates the
non-similar observations.
(v) Low, present. No dominance at all.
(vi) Low, partially present. No dominance at all, but more overlapping among the intervals than in (v).
(viii) Absent (no matter what the reliability is). The probability of a missing observation is equal to one, this value dom-
inates all the other values.
As an example, note that the intervals speciﬁed in Table 1 correspond to the ﬁrst combination. Speciﬁcations of proba-
bility intervals for the other combinations have been obtained by considerations analogous to the ones described in the cap-
tion of Table 1.
6. Information fusion by imprecise probabilities
The procedure described in Sections 4.2 and 5.2 in order to merge the observations gathered by different sensors can be
regarded as a possible imprecise-probability approach to the general information fusion problem. In this section, we take a
short detour from the military aspects to illustrate some key features of such an approach by simple examples.11 Given a credal set KðXÞ over a variable X, and two possible values x; x0 2 XX , we say that the x dominates x0 if PðX ¼ x0Þ < PðX ¼ xÞ for each P 2 KðXÞ. It is easy
to show that interval dominance, i.e., PðX ¼ x0Þ < PðX ¼ xÞ, is a sufﬁcient condition for dominance.
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to the observations of X returned by n sensors, we want to update our beliefs about X, given the values o1; . . . ; on returned by
the sensors.
The most common way to solve this problem is to assess a (precise) probabilistic model over these variables, from which
the conditional probability mass function PðXjo1; . . . ; onÞ can be computed. That may be suited to model situations of relative
consensus among the different sensors. The precise models tend to assign higher probabilities to the values of X returned by
the majority of the sensors, which may be a satisfactory mathematical description of these scenarios.
The problem ismore complex in case of disagreement among the different sensors. In these situations, precisemodels assign
similar posterior probabilities to the different values of X. But a uniform posterior probability mass function seems to model a
condition of indifference (i.e., we trust the different observed values with the same probability), while sensors disagreement
reﬂects instead a condition of ignorance (i.e., we do not know which is the most likely value among the observed ones).
Imprecise-probability models are more suited for these situations. Posterior ignorance about X can be represented by the
impossibility of a precise speciﬁcation of the conditional mass function PðXjo1; . . . ; onÞ. The more disagreement we observe
among the sensors, the wider we expect the posterior intervals to be, for the different values of X.
The case where the bounds of a conditional probability strictly contain those of the corresponding unconditional proba-
bility, and that happens for all the conditional events of a partition, is known in literature as dilation [16], and is relatively
common with coherent imprecise probabilities.
The following small example, despite its simplicity, is sufﬁcient to outline how these particular features are obtained by
our approach.
Example 1. Consider a credal network over a latent variable X, and two manifest variables O1 and O2 denoting the
observations of X returned by two identical sensors. Assume to be given the strong independencies coded by the graph in
Fig. 7. Let all the variables be Boolean. Assume PðXÞ uniform and both PðOi ¼ 1jX ¼ 1Þ and PðOi ¼ 0jX ¼ 0Þ to take values in
the interval ½1 c;1 , for each i ¼ 1;2, where the two parameters 0 <  < c < :5 model a (small) error in the observation
process. Since the network in Fig. 7 can be regarded as a naive credal classiﬁer, where the latent variable X plays the role of the
class node and the observations correspond to the class attributes, we can exploit the algorithm presented in [22, Section 3.1]
to compute the following posterior intervals:Fig. 8.
½:8; :9,
conditiPðX ¼ 1jO1 ¼ 1;O2 ¼ 1Þ 2 1
1þ ð c1c Þ2
;
1
1þ ð 1 Þ2
" #
’ ½:941; :988;
PðX ¼ 1jO1 ¼ 1;O2 ¼ 0Þ 2 1
1þ cð1Þð1cÞ
;
1
1þ ð1cÞcð1Þ
" #
’ ½:308; :692;Fig. 7. The credal network for Example 1.
Posterior intervals for PðX ¼ 1jO1 ¼ 1; . . . ;Om ¼ 1;Omþ1 ¼ 0; . . .O9 ¼ 0Þ as a function of m, assuming both PðOj ¼ 1jX ¼ 1Þ and PðOj ¼ 0jX ¼ 0Þ 2
for each j ¼ 1; . . . ;9, and a uniform PðXÞ. Black dots denote precise posterior probabilities computed assuming the precise value .85 for the
onal probabilities.
Table 2
Sensors observations for the simulations in Fig. 9. The AIRCRAFT HEIGHT according to the tracking radar (SENSOR 6) is very low in (a) and (b), and low in (c).
VARIABLE SENSOR 1 (SSR) SENSOR 2 (3D) SENSOR 3 (2D) SENSOR 4 (TV) SENSOR 5 (GROUND) SENSOR 6 (TRACK)
AIRCRAFT HEIGHT very low very low – – low very low/low
TYPE OF AIRCRAFT – – – helicopter helicopter –
FLIGHT PATH U-path U-path U-path U-path missing U-path
HEIGHT CHANGES descent descent descent – missing descent
ABSOLUTE SPEED slow slow slow – slow slow
R EACTION TO ADDC positive positive positive positive positive positive
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eral case, the ﬁrst interval is strictly greater than .5, a value that represents the middle point of the second interval. Thus, we
can conclude that: (i) consensus between the sensors increases the posterior probability for X; (ii) disagreement increases
our ignorance about X (the probability dilates).12These calculi can be easily generalized to the case of n sensors. As an example, Fig. 8 depicts the posterior intervals for the
observation of a Boolean latent variable by nine identical sensors for different levels of consensus among them. Note that our
approach based on credal networks reproduces the cautious behaviour we want to model, while a Bayesian network would
abruptly change its estimates with the number of correct observations passing from four to ﬁve. Unlike the imprecise case,
precise conditional probabilities might therefore produce unreliable extreme values in the posterior beliefs because of high
sensitivity to small changes in the error rate.
It should be also pointed out that the only assumption required by this approach is the conditional independence be-
tween the manifest variables (observations) given the latent variable (actual value of the quantity to be measured). A con-
dition which seems to be veriﬁed in many concrete cases, as for example that of the military problem we address in this
paper.
In fact, assuming ﬁxed levels of AIRCRAFT HEIGHT, RELIABILITY and PRESENCE, Fig. 4 reproduces the same structure of the proto-
typical example in Fig. 7, with four sensors instead of two. The same holds for any subnetwork modeling the relations be-
tween a latent variable and the relative manifest variables.
7. Algorithmic issues and simulations
The discussion in Section 4 and Section 5 led us to the speciﬁcation of a credal network, associated to the graph in Fig. 5,
deﬁned over the whole set of considered variables, i.e., core variables, observations collected by the different sensors, reli-
ability and presence levels.
At this point, we can evaluate the risk associated to an intrusion, by simply updating the probabilities for the four possible
values of the risk factor, conditional on the values of the observations returned by the sensors.
The size of our credal network prevents an exact computation of the posterior probability intervals.13 Approximate pro-
cedures should be therefore employed, unless we do not want to restrict our analysis to the core of the network by assuming
perfectly reliable observations for all the ideal factors.
The high computational complexity of the updating problem on the whole network should be regarded as the mathemat-
ical counterpart of the difﬁculties experienced by the military experts during the identiﬁcation of the intruder. On the other
side, when all the factors are observed in a perfectly reliable way, the goal of the intruder can be easily detected, exactly as
the mathematical task of updating the core of the network is equivalent to computing class probabilities in a naive credal
classiﬁer, a task efﬁciently solved by the algorithm in [22].
Thus, we have ﬁrst performed extensive simulations on the core of the network. Expert has considered several combina-
tions of values for the ideal factors and checked whether or not the set of undominated classes returned by the core of the
network was including his personal evaluation of the goal of an intruder for that scenario. Every time a mismatch between
the human and the artiﬁcial expert was detected, the quantiﬁcation of the probability for the network was updated. Remark-
ably, at the end of this validation task, we have obtained a network core able to simulate the Expert’s evaluation in almost
every considered scenario.
Then, as a test for the whole network, we have considered a simulated restricted ﬂight area for the protection of a single
object in the Swiss Alps, surveyed by an identiﬁcation architecture characterized by absence of interceptors and relatively
good coverage of all the other sensors. We assumed as meteorological conditions discontinuous low clouds and daylight.
The simulated scenario reproduces a situation where a provocateur is ﬂying very low with a helicopter and without emitting
any identiﬁcation code. The corresponding evidences are reported in Table 2.12 The value  ¼ 0 has been excluded, as it models a situation where both the sensors can be perfectly reliable. Clearly, such a scenario is not compatible with a
disagreement between the observations.
13 The existing algorithms for exact updating of credal networks (e.g., [6,15]) are typically too slow for models with dense topologies and more than 50 nodes.
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Fig. 9. Posterior probability intervals for the risk factor, corresponding to the evidences reported in Table 2. The histogram bounds denote lower and upper
probabilities. The quality of the observation of the AIRCRAFT HEIGHT is assumed to be higher in (b) than in (a). The histograms in (c) refers to a situation of
increased disagreement between the sensors observing the AIRCRAFT HEIGHT. Finally, (d) and (e) report, respectively the exact posterior intervals in a situation
where the observation of the factors is assumed to be perfectly reliable and corresponds to the value returned by the majority of the sensors.
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whose performances in terms of accuracy and scalability seems to be quite good. The posterior intervals were computed in
few seconds on a 2.8GHz Pentium 4 machine.
For this simulation we have assumed uniform prior beliefs about the four classes of risk.14 Fig. 9a depicts the posterior
probability intervals for this simulated scenario. The upper probability for the outcome renegade is zero, and we can therefore
exclude a terrorist attack. Similarly, the lower probability for the outcomes agent provocateur and damaged are strictly
greater than the upper probability for the state erroneous, and we can reject as less credible also this latter value because
of interval dominance.
The ambiguity between agent provocateur and damaged is due, in this case, to the bad observation of the AIRCRAFT
HEIGHT. In fact, a damaged helicopter is expected to land as soon as possible. While, in the modeled scenario, a provocateur
is not expected to land. With a bad observation of the height, we are unable to understand if the helicopter has landed or not
and therefore the ambiguity between the two risk categories is reasonable.
Indecision between agent provocateur and damaged disappears if we assume higher expected levels of RELIABILITY and
PRESENCE for the sensors devoted to the observation of the AIRCRAFT HEIGHT. The results in Fig. 9b state that the intruder is an
agent provocateur, as we have assumed in the design of this simulation.
In Fig. 9c we still consider a high quality observation, but more disagreement between the sensors (see Table 2). This pro-
duces, also in this case, indecision between two classes. Remarkably, as we expect from our model of the information fusion
in case of disagreement, the intervals we observe seem to reproduce the union of the intervals computed on the network
core assuming, respectively very low (Fig. 9d) and low (Fig. 9e) AIRCRAFT HEIGHT.
Remarkably, these results have been recognized by the Expert as reasonable estimates for the considered scenarios. Yet,
an extensive validation process, consisting in analyses of this kind by different military experts on many other scenarios,
should be regarded as a necessary future work.
8. Conclusions and future work
A model for determining the risk of intrusion of a civil aircraft into restricted ﬂight areas has been presented. The model
embeds in a single coherent mathematical framework human expertise expressed by imprecise-probability assessments,
and a structure reproducing complex observation processes and corresponding information fusion schemes.
The risk evaluation corresponds to the updating of the probabilities for the risk factor conditional on the observations of
the sensors and the estimated levels of presence and reliability. Preliminary tests considered for a simulated scenario are
consistent with the judgements of an expert domain for the same situation.
As future work we intend to test the model for other historical cases and simulated scenarios. The approximate updating
procedure considered in the present work, as well as other algorithmic approaches will be considered, in order to determine
the most suited for this speciﬁc problem.
In any case, it seems already possible to offer a practical support to the military experts in their evaluations. They can use
the network to decide the risk level corresponding to a real scenario, but it is also possible to simulate situations and verify
the effectiveness of the different sensors in order to design an optimal identiﬁcation architecture.14 Any credal set can be used to model decision maker’s prior beliefs about the risk factor. Nevertheless, as noted in [14], a vacuous prior (i.e., a credal set equal
to the whole probability simplex) would make vacuous also the posterior inferences.
A. Antonucci et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 666–679 679Finally, we regard our approach to the fusion of the information collected by the different sensors as a sound and ﬂexible
approach to this kind of problems, able to work also in situations of contrasting observations between the sensors.
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